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In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty (ICISS) formulated a doctrine that came to be known as the “re-
sponsibility to protect,” often abbreviated as R2P or RtoP. In 2005, the 
UN World Summit confined the scope of this alleged responsibility to 
genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes and 
confirmed that “the international community” does indeed have the “re-
sponsibility” to prevent or stop such crimes if “national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations” from them (UN General 
Assembly, A/RES/60/1). 
International diplomatic declarations are one thing, however, and sound 
philosophical argument another; and as a presumed embodiment of the lat-
ter the two documents just mentioned might be find wanting. George R. 
Lucas Jr., for example, explicitly noting his “exasperation,” finds “RtoP, 
as finally formulated in the UN Security Council resolution of 2006 […] 
profoundly flawed and deficient” (Lucas 2014: 37). One of the reasons he 
gives for this assessment is that it “seeks to impose RtoP […] as what 
Kant termed a ‘strict duty’ (of justice), even though lacking a clear proce-
dural specification of the obligor, or of the precise means and methods for 
fulfilling that obligation on the part of (undefined) obligees. These latter 
difficulties, however, are fundamental features of imperfect duties, which 
[…] ultimately render them inappropriate and unsuited to law or regula-
tion […]” (ibid.). 
In this chapter, however, I am not so much concerned with the possibil-
ity of legally implementing the alleged “responsibility to protect,” but with 
the question whether there is a moral obligation to militarily intervene in 
another state to stop a genocide from happening (if this can be done with 
proportionate force – since this proviso should go without saying, I will 
not mention it again). To anticipate, my answer is that under exceptional 
circumstances a state or even a non-state actor might be obliged to inter-
vene to stop a genocide, but under most circumstances there is no such ob-
ligation. To wit, if a group of mercenaries of state A signs a contract with 
a minority group in state B specifying that they will militarily intervene in 
case B tries to commit a genocide against this minority group, then the 
 2 
mercenaries have a duty towards that group to intervene if the group in-
deed is faced with genocide. This does not mean that they also have an all 
things considered obligation. If intervention would come at the cost of not 
intervening in another conflict where far more lives are at stake and where 
the mercenaries also have contractual obligations, then these opportunity 
costs might override (but not cancel) the duty towards the minority group. 
That the special duty towards the minority group is only overridden but 
not cancelled is shown by the fact that in case of non-intervention the 
mercenaries would owe the minority group compensation at least for their 
reneging on the contract. However, the point of this chapter is that the 
mercenaries, “humanity,” and states do not have an obligation to make 
such promises in the first place or to create institutions that would impose 
a legal obligation of intervention upon them. Nor do states or persons or 
humanity “collectively” have – originally, without specifically creating 
such duties by contracts or promises – any pro tanto or special duties to 
save strangers at considerable cost to themselves or their own citizens (in-
cluding their soldiers). That is, these costs do not merely override a duty 
to intervene, but rather there is no such duty to begin with – as shown by 
the fact that in such cases of non-intervention agents would not owe those 
they let die any compensation: if I do not save someone’s life because sav-
ing him would have cost me my arm or would have come with a high risk 
of losing my own life, I do not owe this person compensation. Thus the 
point of this chapter is that there is no “natural” or “general” or “original” 
duty to militarily intervene (or to create a legal obligation) to stop a geno-
cide. Why this is the case can be seen by considering the severe shortcom-
ings of arguments to the contrary. I shall turn to these arguments now. 
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1.  Are All Permissible Humanitarian Interventions Also Obligatory? 
On Pattison, Tan, and Lango1 
James Pattison succinctly puts his position as follows: 
 
“To summarize, I claimed that the existence of a general, unassigned duty to un-
dertake humanitarian intervention is the following: intuitively compelling; can be 
defended on the basis solely of negative duties; is a logical corollary of the right to 
intervene; is a logical corollary of basic human rights; and stems from the moral 
obligation to respect humanity and, more specifically, the duty to prevent human 
suffering. … it is not necessary to generate the duty to intervene since this duty al-
ready exists. … Rather, we are looking for the most appropriate way of assigning 
this duty” (Pattison 2010: 193). 
 
Let us take this step by step. In support of his claim that it is “intuitively 
compelling,” Pattison contents himself with inviting the reader to consider 
“the alternative in which there is no such duty and inaction in the face of 
extreme human suffering is acceptable. If this were the case, states did 
nothing wrong, for example, by failing to tackle the genocide in Rwanda” 
(ibid.: 16). However, the issue is military intervention (Pattison explicitly 
defines “humanitarian intervention” as a sort of military intervention, see 
ibid.: 24-30). Refusing to militarily intervene, however, is quite compati-
ble with trying other means to tackle the problem, and therefore Pattison is 
conjuring up a false dichotomy. Moreover, even if only military means 
promised success, it is not at all counter-intuitive to think that states are 
not required to militarily intervene if the costs of intervening would be 
very high, for example in terms of the number of dead soldiers on the side 
____________________ 
1  There is also a recent attempt by Kieran Oberman (2015) to argue that all permis-
sible (state) wars are obligatory. His position relies on what he calls the “Cost 
Principle,” according to which one must not impose more costs on people than 
they are obliged to bear (ibid.: 261). Yet, he does not address the obvious counter-
example to this alleged principle: a tactical bomber can justifiably kill (and thus 
impose costs on) innocent bystanders in the course of his attack on a military tar-
get if these costs are outweighed by the moral importance of the mission, but the 
civilians are not obliged to bear the costs – they are permitted to defend them-
selves. If Oberman disagrees, he should at least address the issue. I addressed it in 
Uwe Steinhoff, “Shalom on the Impermissibility of Self-Defense against the Tac-
tical Bomber” unpublished ms., available at http://philpapers.org/rec/STESOT-9, 
and in Steinhoff (2012b: section 4.3; 2014a; 2016b). 
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of the intervening state (I will return to the low-cost proviso of the duty to 
help others in a moment). 
As regards the negative duties defense, Pattison merely alludes to Tho-
mas Pogge’s claim that “we are all, to a certain extent, implicated in the 
imposition of a global institutional scheme that leads to severe humanitar-
ian crises” from which it allegedly “follows that we possess a duty to 
tackle the human rights violations produced by the existing international 
institutional scheme” (Pattison 2010: 16). Unfortunately, Pattison entirely 
ignores the criticisms of Pogge’s dubious empirical assumption that “the 
international order” “harms” the global poor (see for example Risse 2005) 
as well as of his sweeping and implausible account of collective responsi-
bility, according to which citizens seem to be automatically responsible 
for the actions of their states, and of his unwarranted claim that mere “im-
plication” in wrongs or harms produces remedial duties (see Steinhoff 
2012a, also for further references). Thus, there is simply no reason to ac-
cept the Poggean claims that Pattison relies on. 
Indeed, Pattison seems to realize himself that some might find “these 
causal claims” – that is, the reliance on Pogge – “unpersuasive” (Pattison 
2010: 16). (Again, the problem lies not only with the causal claims, but 
also with implausible assumptions about collective responsibility.) This 
brings him then, moving on, to the claim that the duty to intervene “seems 
to be a logical corollary of the right to intervene” (ibid.: 16). Here he relies 
on Kok-Chor Tan (2006) and John Lango (2001). He quotes Tan saying: 
“If rights violations are severe enough to override the sovereignty of the 
offending state, which is a cornerstone ideal in international affairs, the 
severity of the situation should also impose an obligation on other states to 
end the violation” (Tan 2006: 90, the first emphasis is mine). Yet in the 
paragraph preceding this statement, Tan actually states that the offending 
state “forfeits its claim to sovereignty” (ibid.: 90, my emphasis). However, 
you cannot have it both ways. Either a right is overridden, or it is forfeited. 
This can be illustrated with the difference between a self-defense justifica-
tion and a necessity or lesser evil justification. If a culpable murderous ag-
gressor can only be stopped by breaking his arm, he has forfeited his right 
that his arm not be broken. This is shown by the fact that the defender 
would not owe the aggressor any compensation for breaking his arm. This 
is different if you break the arm of an innocent, non-threatening person in 
order to save the lives of 10 other persons. This might well be justified 
under a lesser evil or necessity justification, but it would involve the in-
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fringement of the innocent person’s right; this is shown in the fact that in 
this case compensation would be due to the innocent person.2 
Perhaps one might be tempted to claim here that Tan’s argument would 
also work in the case of forfeiture: if rights violations are severe enough 
that the offending state even forfeits his right against intervention, then 
they should be severe enough to generate an obligation to intervene. Yet, 
the argument is as unsound in the case of forfeiture as in the case of over-
riding or outweighing. 
Tan himself acknowledges a severe problem for his argument, namely 
that there is “an obvious difference between an offending state and a neu-
tral state such that the sovereignty of one may be overridden [or forfeited] 
but not that of the other” (Tan 2006: 92). Tan suggests that the offending 
state may deserve to forfeit its sovereignty. Yet, I do not think that desert 
has anything to do with it. An innocent or minimally responsible attacker, 
for instance, who is about to kill you (perhaps he mistakenly thinks you 
are about to kill him) does not deserve to die, but he still has forfeited his 
right to life under these circumstances; that is, he would not be wronged if 
you kill him in necessary self-defense. An innocent bystander, however, 
would be wronged if you used him as a shield or kill him as a side-effect 
of your self-defensive measures. In any case, given that there is the obvi-
ous normative difference between the neutral and the offending state (just 
as there is a difference between an attacker and a bystander), Tan is forced 
to deny its importance for the issue at hand. That is, he must deny that it is 
actually the offense that makes the offending state forfeit its sovereignty, 
for otherwise the conclusion he is intent on drawing does not follow. Ac-
cordingly, he claims that it is not the offense, but “the need to protect hu-
man rights that allows for the forfeiture of the offending state” and “com-
pels outsiders to intervene” (Tan 2006: 92-93). Unfortunately, this would 
then also imply that the neutral state is not being wronged if one forces it 
to intervene in case this should be necessary to protect the innocents who 
are threatened by the offending state. Tan is aware of the fact that this is 
counter-intuitive, and tries to escape the unpalatable implication by simply 
claiming that “there is no such need to attack it [the neutral state]” (Tan 
2006: 93). Yet, first, there might well be such a need – that simply de-
pends on the empirical circumstances, and can certainly not be excluded a 
____________________ 
2  That there is a duty to compensate for justifiable rights infringements is the stan-
dard view both in German and Anglo-Saxon law and in moral philosophy. For 
discussions, see Christie (1999) and Sugarman (2006). 
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priori. And second, Tan is missing the point of the objection here. The 
point is that even if it were necessary to force the neutral state to intervene, 
this would still be impermissible and certainly a violation of the rights of 
the neutral state. Consider a domestic analogy: The offender Jack throws a 
child into a river, and the child is about to drown. The innocent (neutral) 
bystanders Jill and Bill are at the scene. The river is quite dangerous, and a 
rescue attempt could be lethal for the rescuer. Jack and Bill can’t swim, 
but Jill can, and Bill is armed. Under these circumstances it is necessary 
for the protection of the child that Bill forces Jill to rescue it. But obvi-
ously, this would be a violation of Jill’s rights. If, on the other hand, Jack 
could swim too, then it does not seem to violate his rights to force him to 
rescue the child. Jill has not forfeited her autonomy (sovereignty), while 
Jack has. Thus, Tan’s assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, it is in-
deed the offense that makes the offending state (or an aggressor) forfeit its 
right to sovereignty (or autonomy). Accordingly, Tan’s argument col-
lapses. 
There are further problems with the “permission implies duty” argu-
ment. These problems even undermine the duty to engage in risk-free in-
terventions (that is, to engage in interventions that involve at least no risk 
for the life and limbs of the intervener). Consider a further domestic ex-
ample. Joan does not like Paul’s nose and tries to shoot him dead, and the 
only way to stop Joan would be to kill her. Robert can do so (without any 
risk to himself), thus saving Paul. In this case, Joan has forfeited her right 
not to be killed by Robert. Does this mean, as Pattison’s and Tan’s (and 
Lango’s) argument has it, that Robert now has a duty to kill Joan? 
It most certainly does not logically or conceptually imply it (which 
means that Pattison’s talk about a logical corollary is out of place). In the 
widely used conceptual framework of Wesley Hohfeld (1919) (if Pattison 
or Tan use another framework, one would like to know what this frame-
work is), Joan’s forfeiture of her claim-right not to be killed by Robert 
logically and conceptually implies Robert’s liberty-right to kill her, but 
most certainly does not imply a duty to kill her (for details, see Steinhoff 
2016a: section II).3 
____________________ 
3  In Hohfeld’s framework your claim-right against me not to be punched by me im-
plies that I have a duty towards you not to punch you. If we both agree to a box-
ing match, however, then I lose said claim-right against you but gain a liberty-
right to punch you, that is, I no longer have the duty not to punch you. This lib-
erty-right to punch you is compatible with your liberty-right to keep me from ex-
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However, one might object that even if there is no logical or conceptual 
correlation, it might still be true for other reasons that under these circum-
stances Robert is obliged to kill Joan. Yet that is extremely dubious. Many 
Western states grant people the right to conscientious objection to military 
service: if someone is absolutely opposed to killing people, then, it is 
thought, he can be exempted from military service. But then, in the same 
vein: if Robert is an absolute pacifist, do we really want to say that he is 
obliged to kill Joan? In fact, why does he need to be an absolute pacifist? 
Wouldn’t it perhaps suffice that he just does not want to kill anybody, that 
he has an aversion to killing people? To be sure, maybe Pattison, Tan, and 
Lango really do think that under these circumstances Robert is obliged to 
kill Joan. But then they cannot uphold a right to conscientious objection 
on grounds of a principled aversion against killing, and they should clearly 
state this. Those in contrast who do accept such a right or do not find it 
plausible that Robert is obliged to kill Joan must reject the theory en-
dorsed by the three authors. 
Moreover, humanitarian interventions do not only kill culpable aggres-
sors. They also produce what is euphemistically called “collateral dam-
age.” In other words, a humanitarian intervention, at least in the real world 
as opposed to a sanitized ideal world, also kills and mutilates innocent 
human beings, including, to be blunt, toddlers and babies. Let us adapt our 
example to this fact. Now Joan is not only trying to kill Paul, but also 20 
other innocent people. Robert could stop her with his grenade. However, 
the explosion of the grenade would also tear Joan’s innocent 3-year-old 
daughter and an innocent bystander into pieces. Is Robert permitted to 
“militarily intervene” that is, to throw the grenade? Under German law, 
according to majority opinion, he is not: the self-defense justification ap-
plies only to the killing of an aggressor. The killing of innocent bystand-
ers, however, would have to be justified under a justifying emergency jus-
tification (rechtfertigender Notstand). Here rights are indeed overridden. 
Yet, German law excludes the killing of innocent people from the scope of 
said justification (Bott 2011). Some other jurisdictions (with their neces-
sity or lesser evil justifications) take the same view. However, there are 
also jurisdictions that seem to allow the throwing of the grenade, for ex-
ample those US-American states that have adopted the choice of evils jus-
tification of the Model Penal Code, which is applicable to the killing of a 
___________________ 
ercising my liberty – to wit, you have the liberty to knock me out before I punch 
you. 
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smaller number of innocent people for the sake of avoiding the killing of a 
greater number of innocent people (Hoffheimer 2007-2008). Moreover, 
just war theory, at least all those versions of it that accept the doctrine of 
double effect (most forms of just war theory do), clearly allows the killing 
of innocent people as a side effect of an attack on a legitimate target: it al-
lows it if the constraints of the doctrine are fulfilled, that is, if the “collat-
eral damage” is not disproportionate (in light of the moral good that the at-
tack on the legitimate target achieves) and was not intended as a means to 
an end or as an end in itself (Steinhoff 2007: 34).4 Thus, whatever ratio of 
innocent lives saved to innocent lives destroyed the defenders of humani-
tarian intervention like Pattison, Tan, or Lango find acceptable: if this ra-
tio is in fact fulfilled in the case of Joan, Paul, Robert and n other inno-
cents, then Robert must be justified in blowing up Joan, her small daugh-
ter, and the innocent bystander. And then, according to the authors under 
discussion, Robert must also have a duty to throw the grenade. That is, he 
must have a duty to engage in an action that he knows will kill two inno-
cent people. 
Is such a stance really plausible? It does not seem so. Consider, for ex-
ample, the much discussed trolley case. Yes, it might be permissible to di-
vert a runaway trolley away from five trapped and innocent people who 
would be killed by it in the direction of just one innocent person who will 
then be killed instead (the option that nobody will be killed is not given). 
But is this obligatory? After all, many philosophers make a distinction be-
tween killing and letting die and think that the former is morally worse 
than the latter (Howard-Snyder 2011). By not turning the trolley one lets 
the five just die; by turning it, however, one kills the one. The person who 
turns the trolley is the cause of the one innocent person’s death, while he 
is not the cause of the death of the five persons if he does not turn the trol-
ley. Likewise, if Robert does not throw the grenade, he lets the n innocent 
people die; by throwing the grenade, however, he kills two innocent peo-
ple. Is Robert really obliged to do that? 
Pattison’s, Tan’s, and Lango’s view implies that he is. Penal law in 
Western jurisdictions disagrees. Virtually all Western jurisdictions ac-
knowledge that there can be a necessity or lesser evil justification for 
overriding rights, but not one Western jurisdiction accepts or as much as 
____________________ 
4  I myself reject the doctrine, see Steinhoff (2007: 33-52). I do accept, however, 
that the harming of innocent bystanders can be justified by a necessity or lesser 
evil justification. 
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suggests that there is also a lesser evil obligation. Pattison, Tan, and 
Lango, in contrast, boldly convert mere lesser evil justifications into full-
blown obligations, and Pattison and Lango even go so far as to claim that 
the “burden of proof” lies with those who deny that the right to engage in a 
humanitarian intervention is accompanied by a duty to engage in the inter-
vention (Pattison 2010: 17; Lango 2001: 183). In the light of the legal re-
alities, however, which are probably an indicator of widely shared moral 
intuitions, such a claim has no foundation. 
As regards Pattison’s claim that the duty to intervene is “a logically 
corollary […] of basic human rights,” all Pattison offers is a passing refer-
ence to Henry Shue, who “argues that basic rights imply correlative duties 
to enforce these rights” (Pattison 2010: 19). Even if Shue were correct 
about this,5 however, the problem of the low cost proviso remains: I do 
not have the duty to protect others’ rights at the expense of mine. 
Exactly the same problem arises, finally, with regard to Pattison’s claim 
that the alleged duty to intervene “stems from the moral obligation to re-
spect humanity and, more specifically, the duty to prevent human suffer-
ing” (Pattison 2010: 19). It would not appear that a soldier’s humanity is 
respected if he is used as a means and forced to risk his life to save others. 
As the very same Henry Shue whom, as we just saw, Pattison enlists for 
his own purposes notes: 
 
“A requirement that someone sacrifice the enjoyment of his or her own basic 
rights in order that someone else’s basic rights be enjoyed would, obviously, be a 
degrading inequality. No such transfer could possibly be required” (Shue 1980: 
114). 
 
2.  The Low Cost Proviso vs. the “General Duty to Intervene” 
Let us now turn to the low cost proviso of the duty of beneficence in more 
detail. This will also shed light on Pattison’s claim that “it is not necessary 
to generate the duty to intervene since this duty already exists” (Pattison 
____________________ 
5  I do not think he is, but for reasons of space I will not argue this point here. For 
what it is worth, however, I would like to point out that the claim that there is 
such a “correlative duty” seems to be entirely question-begging in the context of 
an argument that tries to establish a duty to protect in the first place. For a criti-
cism of Shue, see Narveson (1985). 
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2010: 193). Given that he is explicitly referring to a general duty (ibid.), 
the statement just quoted, however, seems to contradict what Pattison says 
elsewhere: 
 
“[T]here is a duty to intervene, which may apply to states and other agents on oc-
casion. Like the duty to rescue (e.g., in cases of a child drowning in a pond), the 
carrying out of this duty may require that reasonable costs be borne […]” (Patti-
son 2014: 117). 
 
Obviously, there is a big difference between a “general” duty and a duty 
that people “may” have “on occasion.” Moreover, where the reasonable 
cost proviso is not satisfied, people will have no duty to intervene: a per-
son is not required to save the drowning child if there is a significant risk 
that he may drown himself in the attempt to rescue the child. This at least 
is the legal take on the issue in those jurisdictions that have Samaritan 
laws, and it also seems to be the correct stance from a moral point of view. 
This low cost proviso is also applicable to humanitarian intervention, 
undermining the alleged duty to intervene. Pattison duly notes the argu-
ment “that in almost all actual cases the cost of intervention would be un-
reasonable for the intervening soldiers. They would be asked to bear too 
much in order to save the lives of foreigners, such as the risk of death and 
injury” (Pattison 2014: 122).6 Yet he entirely underestimates its force. In 
reply, he simply states that “as we have seen, intervening soldiers may 
have role-based duties to undertake humanitarian intervention, and this 
means that even very risky actions can sometimes reasonably be required 
of them” (ibid.: 123). 
Where, exactly, have we seen that? Well, a few pages earlier Pattison 
explains that “the claim that soldiers do not consent to perform armed hu-
manitarian interventions is erroneous, since such operations can now 
clearly be expected by soldiers when they enlist” (ibid.: 119). Yet, first, 
whether that can be “clearly expected” depends on what is stipulated in 
the actual contract. Consider, for example, a Mexican actor who has the 
habit of asking his body-guards to constantly intervene on behalf of inno-
cent bystanders in Mexican gang fights. The life expectancy of his body-
____________________ 
6  Tan claims: “[W]ere the limited view of the soldier’s duty accepted, it would also 
follow that there can be no permissible intervention” (2006: 108, see also 109). 
Actually, that would not follow at all: the soldiers are free to consent to engage in 
humanitarian intervention. 
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guards, at least of those who follow his orders, is accordingly low. One 
day he again orders his new bodyguard to interfere in a shoot-out to save 
some innocent bystanders. The bodyguard refuses, pointing out that he 
didn’t sign up for that. The actor points out that the bodyguard knew about 
his, the actor’s, altruistic tendency to risk other people’s lives (not his 
own, God forbid) for the benefit of strangers. The bodyguard replies that 
the actor, conversely, knew that contracts are made precisely in order to 
lay down the rights and obligations of the contracting parties; thus if the 
actor wanted him, the bodyguard, to risk his life for strangers, he should 
have put this in the contract. He didn’t. This seems to be an entirely fair 
reply.7 
Moreover, second, even if we are only talking about “expectations” as 
opposed to actual contracts, it is simply wrong that “soldiers” – all sol-
diers – are “clearly expected” to perform in such operations when they en-
list. Soldiers whose states in the past did not engage in such operations can 
of course justly complain when their states suddenly change their minds. 
Furthermore, just as there is, as I pointed out, an obvious difference be-
tween a general duty and a duty people have “on occasion,” there is also 
an obvious difference between a general duty and a role-based duty. In 
other words, even if Pattison were right that soldiers have a role-based 
duty to intervene, that does nothing to establish that there is a general duty 
to intervene, as he claims. So far he has in fact not provided any argument 
that would support the latter claim. 
The situation is even worse. After all, the role-based duty is not really a 
role-based duty to intervene, but a role-based duty to follow orders. To 
wit, President Clinton would probably not have been amused if American 
soldiers had intervened in Rwanda without orders. In all likelihood, he 
would have court-martialed such interveners precisely to remind them of 
their role-based duty to obey orders. In other words, as long as they do not 
receive orders to intervene, soldiers do not have a role-based duty to inter-
vene but rather a role-based duty not to intervene.8 Thus, while Pattison 
____________________ 
7  Of course, one could put this into a new contract. However, as long as it isn’t in 
the contract, the bodyguard (or the soldier) does not have the duty to save strang-
ers at high cost to himself. Moreover, there is, for the reasons given, no duty for 
actors or state leaders to put it into the contract, nor is there a duty for potential 
bodyguards or soldiers to sign such revised contracts. 
8  Moreover, there is an additional complication, noted by Pattison himself, namely 
that “soldiers may […] not necessarily have duties to obey their leaders” (ibid. 
2014: 119). I will ignore this complication here. 
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claims that “it is not necessary to generate the duty to intervene since this 
duty already exists,” it actually is necessary to generate it, at least as far as 
the soldiers are concerned: the leaders would have to generate it by an or-
der. 
What about the leaders themselves? Do they have a duty to intervene, in 
the form of a duty to give the order and see to its execution? Pattison an-
swers in the affirmative; more precisely, he claims that “the leaders of the 
intervener […] may have duties to order their soldiers to take on greater 
costs, even if it is the case that one holds that their soldiers do not have du-
ties to do so” (Pattison 2014: 119). In support of this claim, Pattison envi-
sions a potential intervention in Angola and a scenario where the Ameri-
can President faces a choice between a tactic that condemns ten American 
soldiers to likely death but avoids the collateral death of 1,000 Angolans 
and a tactic that avoids any risk to American soldiers but leads to the col-
lateral death of 1,000 Angolans. Pattison thinks that the President should 
choose the first option (ibid.: 119). I agree: if these are the only options. 
However, there is an obvious third option: not to intervene at all. In other 
words, answering the question as to which of the two options of interven-
tion are morally preferable does not at all answer the question as to 
whether there is a duty to intervene in the first place. 
So let us face this latter question. Does the leader in Pattison’s example 
actually have a duty to intervene (by ordering the soldiers “to go in”)? Let 
us illuminate the question by going back to the bodyguard example. Let us 
even suppose that the bodyguard did sign a contract that allows his em-
ployer to order him to risk his life on behalf of innocent third parties. Sup-
pose now that confronted with another shooting, the bodyguard implores 
his employer not to order him to intervene and risk his life for the sake of, 
let’s say, five innocent bystanders. Is the employer really under a duty to 
order the bodyguard to intervene against the bodyguard’s express wishes? 
Vary the example: there are five bodyguards and 25 innocent bystanders 
to save. However, an intervention would definitely cost one of the body-
guards his life. Is the employer under a duty to order intervention? 
I doubt it, in both cases. I think that in both cases the employer has a 
justification, namely a necessity or lesser evil justification, to order the 
bodyguards to intervene, but, as already pointed out above, one does not 
get from a justification to an obligation as quickly and easily as Pattison, 
Lango and Tan assume. Moreover, I have not even factored in the problem 
of collateral damage in the examples. Let us do so now. Imagine the 25 
innocent bystanders can only be saved by the bodyguards if the body-
guards also collaterally kill two or three innocent bystanders. Is the leader 
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(or the state) still obliged to order intervention, and thus to order a course 
of action where he will not only be responsible for the saving of innocent 
people but also, through his very agents, for the killing of innocent peo-
ple? In the light of the discussion above of the case of Joan, Paul, Robert 
and the n other innocents, it does not seem so. At least, Pattison has not 
provided an argument to the contrary, nor, as far as I can see, has anyone 
else. 
 
3.  Can the Appeal to Collectives Circumvent the Problems Posed by 
the Low Cost Proviso? 
Before concluding our discussion of the low cost proviso, a rather odd 
way of trying to circumvent it must be noted. To wit, Lango claims that 
“[m]embers of an intervening military force can suffer costs that are ex-
cessive for them but not for their state – namely, their deaths. […] Thus 
we encounter a moral paradox of intervention: even if it is obligatory for 
(the citizens of) a state (collectively) to intervene, it can still be only su-
pererogatory (individually) for its citizens” (Lango 2001: 186). This is a 
paradox indeed, and if an argument leads to a paradoxical conclusion, then 
this is usually a reliable indication that there is something seriously wrong 
with the argument. As Dobos rightly points out: “to talk of the state’s duty 
to intervene is somewhat peculiar if the compliance of its people is ac-
knowledged to be optional” (Dobos 2012: 177). The same is true of any 
other collective’s alleged duty to intervene. Consider for instance Tan’s 
example of a group of people who see a person drowning (borrowed from 
Feinberg 1970: 243-44). Tan says that “all parties are to contribute to the 
rescue in ways commensurate with their ability and the needs of the rescue 
operation” (Tan 2006: 103). That is simply wrong, however. Even if what 
the rescue operation needed were that all ten bystanders, let’s say, sacri-
fice themselves for the drowning person, and even if they were all able to 
do so, this most certainly does not mean that they are morally required to 
do so. 
Let us make the example a little bit less extreme. Suppose the only way 
to save the drowning person is for one of the ten bystanders to risk his life. 
However, given the low cost proviso, none of them has the duty to do so. 
Of course, one of them, A, could draw a gun and force one of the others, 
B, to swim to the rescue, thereby risking his life. Thus A could help in a 
way that circumvents the low cost proviso (for him). However, this way – 
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coercing B – would certainly be impermissible (and therefore not obliga-
tory) and violate the rights of B. In any case, it seems that if these are the 
only available options for saving the drowning person’s life, then the “col-
lective” of the ten bystanders simply does not have the duty to come to the 
rescue. To simply slap “collectives” with “collective duties” without pre-
viously paying attention to whether these alleged duties are translatable 
into obligatory individual action looks like a sort of philosophical voodoo. 
If no member of the collective has individual duties that would actually 
lead to the rescue, then the collective itself has no duty to come to the res-
cue. To assume the contrary is not only “paradoxical,” it is illogical. 
 
4.  Costly and Ineffective Saving By and With Killing vs. Cheap and 
Effective Saving Without Killing 
The case for a duty of intervention that is “already there” can still be fur-
ther undermined, not least in the light of some of Pattison’s own premises. 
To wit, Pattison supports his choice in the Angola example by claiming 
that the President has “a duty to save the greatest number that is not out-
weighed by her associative duties and role-based duties as president [that 
is, by her fiduciary duties towards her citizens and soldiers]” (Pattison 
2014: 119). But if that is the case, then she should not engage in humani-
tarian military intervention but rather save the starving and poor by pro-
viding money, food, medical help, and infrastructure, for example. After 
all, military interventions are extremely costly. Many more lives could be 
saved if one spent the money, time, and efforts on helping the poor. This 
is simply a fact of our real world.9 
____________________ 
9  See on this, also for some interesting numbers, Dobos (2012: 169-70) and Singer 
(2010). An anonymous reviewer suggested that the “primary negative conse-
quences” of not offering humanitarian aid might be higher than the primary con-
sequences of not intervening, but that the “secondary negative consequences of 
not intervening” might be much higher still. I assume that the reviewer is refer-
ring to deterrence effects here: if one does not intervene, more genocides will take 
place. First, however, that is pure speculation; second, the number of lives lost in 
those additional genocides would have to be higher than the lives lost due to not 
offering humanitarian aid, which is dubious at best; and third, if there are “secon-
dary” effects in terms of deterrence, then there are also “secondary” effects in 
terms of imitation: by intervening instead of saving much larger numbers with 
humanitarian help one encourages others to do the same. It would therefore ap-
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Moreover, helping the poor does not just give us “more bang for our hu-
manitarian buck” than humanitarian intervention (Dobos 2012: 170); it 
also allows the state leader to refrain from morally problematic acts like 
endangering the lives of her soldiers and making them engage in opera-
tions where some of them will inevitably kill innocent people, including 
babies and toddlers. It simply seems to be an overall moral win-win situa-
tion. The leader here not only helps more strangers, she also seems to far 
better abide by her other duties, both with regard to her own soldiers and 
citizens and with regard to innocent strangers whose rights she would vio-
late by transforming them into “collateral damage.” 
Some might be tempted to object here that the leader can have a duty 
both to help the starving and to engage in humanitarian military interven-
tion (a duty, to repeat, that in the real world can only be discharged by also 
killing innocent people). Yet, first, the low cost proviso stands in the way 
here. The costs the leader would have to impose upon her citizens in order 
to save all poor people (and all ill people whom it is medically possible to 
save – medical costs can be exorbitant – and all people threatened by natu-
ral catastrophes, etc.) will in all likelihood exceed the costs the citizens are 
required to bear. Then, however, a choice has to be made whom to save – 
which brings us back to Pattison’s own statement that one should rather 
save the larger number. This speaks against humanitarian intervention. 
Second, and even more importantly, the leader also has to consider her 
political possibilities. In other words, even if helping everybody would not 
exceed the low cost proviso, she cannot have a duty to order a humanitar-
ian military intervention if this would undermine her efforts – since her 
constituency won’t play along – to save a much larger number of people 
with a non-military intervention. 
Let us illustrate the preceding points with another variation of our body-
guard example. The employer can either order his five bodyguards to save 
the 25 innocent people, foreseeing that in the course of doing so the body-
guards will kill two or three innocent bystanders and also have one of their 
own killed; or he can order his five bodyguards to save 70 drowning peo-
ple (or even 500? – as I said: military interventions are very expensive), 
foreseeing that in doing so none of the bodyguards will die, and none of 
the bodyguards will kill innocent people. If the bodyguards cannot save 
___________________ 
pear that the secondary consequences of intervention without humanitarian aid are 
much worse than the secondary consequences of humanitarian aid without mili-
tary intervention. 
 16 
both groups (and indeed, they cannot be in two places at the same time), it 
would appear that the employer should rather choose the second option. 
At the very least, he has no duty to choose the first option. 
This would be correct even if the bodyguards could in fact do both but 
simply won’t. If the employer does not have enough power to make them 
do both, he should save the larger number, it seems. At the very least, he 
has no duty to choose the first option and save the smaller number, collat-
erally killing a few innocents. The same applies to presidents. 
 
5.  Raising the Value of Intervention? On Evils and Retribution 
In my experience, quite a few people (for example at conferences on hu-
manitarian intervention) try to resist this conclusion. They seem to think 
that the (alleged) duty to prevent genocide is stronger than the (alleged) 
duty to save the starving. However, what could the explanation for this 
presumed but rather startling greater stringency possibly be?10 
Perhaps one might think that being killed by aggressors is a greater evil 
than, for instance, accidental death, so that, all else being equal, a humani-
tarian military intervention would avert a greater evil than an intervention 
that saves people from threats that do not come in the form of aggression. 
Yet it is in fact not very likely that death by aggression is much more evil 
than death by accident or natural forces. Victor Tadros, for instance, in-
vites us to consider a situation where you have to choose between taking a 
way home where bandits will set their wolves on you and you will be seri-
ously injured, and another way home where a wild pack of wolves will at-
tack you on their own and seriously injure you (Tadros 2011: 105.) He 
states that this difference might make the second way home preferable to 
the first one – but only slightly so. “A relatively small reduction in the risk 
of being harmed can outweigh the interest that we have in others recogniz-
ing our moral status” (ibid.: 106). In other words, if the first road home 
were only slightly safer, we would probably prefer that road. Of course, 
one might claim that what happens on the first road is still the far greater 
evil, regardless of what our preferences are. Yet disconnecting the concept 
____________________ 
10  David Rodin has recently offered a “tentative proposal” to answer this question 
(ibid. 2014: 259-60). I cannot discuss this proposal here for the simple reason that 
I find it unintelligible.  
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of evil in this way from our actual preferences and aversions seems to 
amount to little more than a dogmatic and quasi-religious stipulation. 
Another potential explanation would appeal to the concept of retribu-
tion. According to (certain forms of) retributivist theories, proportionately 
punishing culpable wrongdoers is a value in itself; the fact that someone is 
a culpable wrongdoer hence provides one with an (of course defeasible) 
reason to punish him. One might ask what this has to do with humanitar-
ian military intervention, since humanitarian wars are usually strictly dis-
tinguished from punishment. In fact, however, just as acts of self-defense 
will empirically often also be acts of punishment (the defender both wants 
to defend himself and to punish the aggressor) (Steinhoff 2007: 49-50; 
compare also Fletcher 1989), certain wars will be simultaneously aimed at 
stopping an aggression and punishing it. Moreover, one can also adopt a 
wider account of retributivism, holding that proportionately harming cul-
pable wrongdoers or making them suffer is a value in itself, whether this 
suffering is produced by intentional punishment or not. Acts of war will 
harm their human targets or make them suffer. Thus, the alleged greater 
stringency of the duty to engage in humanitarian military intervention, 
compared with the duty to save people from starvation or natural catastro-
phes, could perhaps be explained by the added value of making culpable 
wrongdoers suffer.11 
Yet while this idea might have some traction, it can hardly pull suffi-
cient weight in the present context. After all, we normally say that it is 
better to let ten guilty people go free than to punish one innocent person. 
Yet it is not just guilty people who are killed and suffer in a humanitarian 
military intervention. Innocent people, too, are “collaterally” killed, muti-
lated, burned, injured. This is not the case in non-military interventions. 
Moreover, even if making the guilty suffer had some value, some moral or 
normative weight, short of succumbing to a vengefulness of Biblical pro-
portions one can hardly deem it so important as to claim that it outweighs 
the deaths of the two, three, or even five or seven times more innocents 
that one could have saved by opting for non-militarily saving the poor in-
stead. 
I conclude that there is no general, already existing duty to militarily in-
tervene in order to safe others from mass atrocities or even genocide. 
 
____________________ 
11  The last two paragraphs draw on material in Steinhoff (2016a: 205-206). 
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6. Generating a Duty to Intervene? 
If one considers as the sole source of the alleged “duty to intervene” the 
moral status, the rights, the humanity of the victims who are to be saved 
through the military intervention, then Pattison’s principle that one should 
save the greatest number appears to be inescapable. However, this under-
mines the duty to militarily intervene, as I argued, since the opportunity 
costs in terms of lives not being saved by non-military intervention are 
simply too high. If one spends one’s resources on helping the poor instead, 
many more lives could be saved. Discussing the topic of the perhaps par-
ticularly great evil of aggression and the potential intrinsic value of retri-
bution, I introduced another source or co-source of the alleged duty: the 
perpetrator. Yet I argued that appeals to the evil of aggression or the value 
of retribution cannot tip the balance against the victim-centered principle. 
Yet there is obviously a third group to consider as well, namely the in-
terveners: the intervening soldiers, their leaders, and their fellow citizens. 
How could this third group generate a duty to intervene? Well, it is nor-
mally assumed that states and their leadership have a special fiduciary 
duty to their citizens. This does not mean that states, their leadership, and 
the citizens themselves cannot have duties towards outsiders, but it does 
mean that the state has certain duties towards its citizens that it does not 
have to outsiders. For instance, states are expected by their citizenry, quite 
rightly, it would seem, to spend the resources of the public health services 
(if there are any) on the citizenry and not on the whole world. Pattison, in 
fact, accepts that there is this fiduciary duty, but he merely sees it as an 
obstacle to be overcome in the course of an argument for humanitarian in-
tervention (Pattison 2010: 17-19, 131-34), not as something that could po-
tentially support it. 
To allay suspicions, we should note that such fiduciary duties are en-
tirely compatible with the well-known tenet that all persons have “equal 
moral worth.”12 Parents who deem themselves justified in caring more for 
their own children than for the children of others need not think that their 
children are intrinsically or from an impartial point of view more valuable 
than the children of other parents. They can (and mostly will) simply think 
that they have an agent-relative prerogative – and probably even obliga-
tion – to care more for their children than for those of others. If they have 
to save either their own child or an unknown child from drowning, they 
____________________ 
12  For both explorations and doubts about this tenet, see Steinhoff (2014b). 
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will not toss a coin – nor should they. In fact, even someone who as em-
phatically endorses the equal moral worth of all persons as the “social jus-
tice cosmopolitan” Thomas Pogge concedes that human beings “need to 
have the option, at least, to have special relationships with friends and 
family that cause their conduct to be at variance with the cosmopolitan re-
quirement of impartiality” (Pogge 2012: 328). Likewise, Cécile Fabre en-
dorses a “principle of fundamental equality whereby individuals have 
equal moral worth” (Fabre 2012: 20); yet she also permits “patriotic parti-
ality” (ibid.: section 1.3.2) and admits that “individuals are permitted to 
confer greater weight on their own goals, projects, and attachments” (ibid.: 
21). Thus, this latter principle or permission is intuitive and widely ac-
cepted, and it stands unrefuted.13 
Now, how could the fiduciary duty translate – under certain circum-
stances – into a duty to intervene? The answer is that part of the fiduciary 
duty is that the leadership must be reasonably responsive to the interests, 
preferences, and ideals of the citizenry. But then, as Dobos and Coady 
point out, it could appear that if “the citizens overwhelmingly support in-
tervention [...] it is by refusing to intervene that the state might be said to 
infringe the rights of its people” (Dobos/Coady 2014: 92). While they cau-
tion against overstating this argument, given that in a representative de-
mocracy “the state is not merely a delegate” but a free agent who must ex-
ercise his judgment on behalf of his principal, the people (ibid.: 93), they 
do in the end admit that “[i]t may be the case that it [military humanitarian 
intervention] is either obligatory or prohibited when the preferences of the 
citizens are unequivocal (as in the clear-cut cases of ‘overwhelming sup-
port’ or ‘overwhelming rejection’” (ibid.: 94). 
Moreover, even if the citizens did not strictly speaking have a right that 
the leader decide to intervene, the leader might still be obliged to inter-
vene. In other words, the fiduciary relation might not only create 
Hohfeldian right-duty relations between the leader and her constituency, 
but also “free-floating” duties.14 To use an analogy: even many people 
who think that animals do not have rights might claim that a dog owner 
has a duty to care for his dog and not let him starve to death. This duty 
would not be based on the dog’s rights but on a general duty to treat even 
____________________ 
13  Of course, people could flatly deny that principle, but it seems the burden of proof 
would then be on them. 
14  The expression “free-floating” is taken from Feinberg (1990: 18-20) who applies 
it to evils. I do not use it in his sense, but in the sense described in the main text 
above. 
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animals, in particular one’s pets, with a certain minimal respect. Likewise, 
the leader of the state probably has a duty to see to the common good. Of 
course, she could come to the conclusion that an intervention, although 
widely supported, would not serve the common good; but, on the other 
hand, the common good is certainly not dissociated from the preferences 
and ideals of the population. Accordingly, when a sufficiently large part of 
the citizenry supports intervention, then, all else being equal, this would 
be a strong indication that such an intervention indeed serves the common 
good. 
Thus a state may have a duty to intervene if it has soldiers willing to do 
so and a citizenry that prefers saving comparatively small numbers of 
people by bombing aggressors and innocent bystanders, including babies 
and toddlers, to saving a comparatively large number of people by send-
ing, say, food parcels. It is not entirely clear that one should call this duty 
“humanitarian,” though.  
One last point of clarification: the previous paragraph might sound ten-
dentious, and the reader might get the impression that I am against hu-
manitarian interventions. That is not correct. My point, rather, is that “we” 
engage in or call for humanitarian interventions more for us than for 
“them.” That is, pace Singer (2010), not necessarily wrong. We do have 
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